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Gloria Anzaldúa’s writing has been read as decolonial based on her resistance to
dominant national, racial, and cultural formations. This essay turns to unpublished
documents from the Gloria Anzaldúa archive that are decolonial at a more
fundamental level. In autobiographical writings about her own experiences with
disability, as well as doodles and figure drawings, the alternate forms of human life
that Anzaldúa depicts defy the logics of identification and differentiation that underlie
colonial hierarchies. Refusing to fix bodies with labels, Anzaldúa accepted mystical
encounters and inter-species minglings without judgment. She experienced her own
disabling conditions (including a severe hormone imbalance and Type 1 diabetes) in
the epistemological fold between medical diagnoses (which enforce the coloniality of
power, knowledge, and being) and trans-corporeal perceptions that defy empirical
analysis. I analyze the ways in which these more capacious ways of being resonate
with recent developments in posthumanist theory and disability ethics.
Keywords: Gloria Anzaldúa; disability; posthumanism

Introduction
I came to disability theory as a scholar of Gloria Anzaldúa, trying to understand the meaning
Anzaldúa drew from her experiences with hormone imbalance and Type 1 diabetes: the
corporeal surprises, the unwanted reliance upon the practices of conventional medicine, the
shifts in consciousness, and the altered productivity that comes with prolonged discomfort.
Though some might argue that chronic illnesses like diabetes are not ‘disabilities’, the
upheavals and the deviance from normative bodily functioning that come with diabetes
resonate with disability frameworks. Disability encompasses a variety of conditions (visible
and invisible, temporary and permanent, corporeal and psychological) and undermines the
idea that bodies must be static and coherent. In its power to challenge universal assumptions
about the forms and functions of the human, disability theory is a crucial ally for feminist,
queer, and decolonial inquiry.
After introducing my theoretical framework below, I turn to an analysis of how Anzaldúa’s
work defies the identities produced by colonial power structures. In particular, ‘La serpiente
© The Authors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0
License
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que se come su cola [The snake that eats its own tail],’ an unpublished memoir found in her
archive at the University of Texas at Austin, takes Anzaldúa herself as a reference point that
challenges conventional understandings of human life1. Shifting from the verbal to the visual,
I then analyze a few figure drawings from the archive that vividly illustrate the ways in which
Anzaldúa’s imagination pushed against the individuation of human and other-than-human
beings. These figures resonate with disability ethics and posthumanist theory but emerge
from other sources.

My theoretical toolbox
Though studies of Anzaldúa’s work through the lens of disability are emerging (see for
example Bost, 2009; Levins Morales, 2013; McMaster, 2005, and Minich, 2013), Anzaldúa is
generally known for her decolonization of race, nation, and gender. Most famously, her
theories of the borderlands and mestiza consciousness– as elaborated in Borderlands/La
Frontera (1987) – shift the terms of identity away from national and racial boundaries
towards fluid interactions among multiple ways of being: the ‘new mestiza,’ for instance,
‘operates in a pluralistic mode – nothing is thrust out, the good the bad and the ugly, nothing
rejected, nothing abandoned’ (1987:79). And, ‘though it is a source of intense pain,’ the
energy of mestiza consciousness ‘comes from the continual creative motion that keeps
breaking down the unitary aspect of each new paradigm’ (80). As Chicana feminist critic
Norma Alarcón (2003:367) has argued, the subject in Anzaldúa’s work is ‘a crossroads, a
collision course, a clearinghouse, an endless alterity who… appears as a tireless peregrine
collecting all of the parts that will never make her whole.’ In this ‘endless alterity’, Anzaldúa
adopts a ‘pathological condition’ and presents a ‘break with a developmental view of selfinscription’ (362). Alarcón’s use of the term ‘pathological’ is particularly apt, in my view, as
Anzaldúa specifically embraces fluid embodiments that exceed the normative standards of
(physical and mental) health in the United States today.
In this paper, I turn to the ways in which Anzaldúa’s writings about her own experiences with
disabling conditions are decolonial at a level even more fundamental than race, nation, or
gender. Her approach to bodies defies the colonial logic of representation and identification
itself. Refusing to fix bodies with labels (including the label ‘disabled’), Anzaldúa accepted
mystical encounters, unknown worlds, and inter-species minglings without judgment.
In an interview with AnaLouise Keating, for instance, Anzaldúa (2000:284) explained how
when she’s ‘trancing,’ she becomes her totem animal, a jaguar, a serpent, or an eagle looking
down at the ground from above. When Keating asked how literal she was about these transhuman embodiments, Anzaldúa explained that a second or third body can leave the physical
body to become a jaguar, can even lose the flesh-and-blood body and ‘stay in the jaguar
reality, in the jaguar form.’ The implications of these propositions are tremendous, laying the
1563

Disability and the Global South

foundation for a radically expansive understanding of identity. These claims also have
particular resonance for a writer whose diabetes brought about sudden changes in blood
sugar, dizziness, extreme fatigue, bleeding eyes, and the threat of amputation. ‘I felt as
though I had been transformed into an alien other and it was cannibalizing my flesh from the
inside,’ she writes of her early experiences with diabetes (Anzaldúa, n.d2). The illness made
her body strange, irrational – the latter term signifying defiance of reason as well as
something that cannot be counted according to established frameworks of identity.
Anibal Quijano (2000) and María Lugones (2008) have demonstrated that identity (especially
race, class, and gender) is a product of the coloniality of power. In order to differentiate the
colonizer from the colonized, or the citizen from the savage, identities were sorted by visual
classification systems based on skin color, labor, dress, and gender roles. Resisting identity
categories, as Anzaldúa consistently has, is a decolonial practice that undermines the
foundations of these hierarchical structures. And, more radically, by blending species and
shifting shapes, the bodies that populate Anzaldúa’s work undermine the logic of domination
and exceptionalism that depended upon race and species differentiation.
For Quijano (2000:555), the separation of body and non-body was also foundational to the
coloniality of power in that the justification given for the colonization of certain races was
that they were ‘closer to nature,’ more body than reason. The ways in which Anzaldúa
redraws the boundaries of the body and reclaims ‘nature’ (and nonhuman animals) as a source
of intellectual and ethical action, defies this colonialist narrative:
Your identity has roots you share with all people and other beings – spirit, feeling, and
body make up a greater identity category. The body is rooted in the earth, la tierra
itself. You meet ensoulment in trees, in woods, in streams. The roots del árbol de la
vida of all planetary beings are nature, soul, body. (Anzaldúa 2002:560)
If humans share ‘roots’ with trees, woods, and streams, we must be aware of how our actions
are intertwined with these other-than-human elements, with repercussions shared among
species (an insight long at the center of ecocriticism).
Colonialism and Humanism conceive of progress as evolution from primitive nature to
rational civilization. Anzaldúa’s embrace of pre-colonial indigenous epistemologies, turning
to the past in order to rethink the future, subverts this historical linearity2. In the 1980s and
90s, while other feminist, queer, and postcolonial thinkers were turning to postmodern theory,
Anzaldúa was turning to Coatlicue, the Aztec goddess of creation and destruction, and her
disloyal daughter, the moon goddess Coyolxauhqui. According to Aztec legend,
Coyolxauhqui was dismembered by her brother, the war god Huitzilopochtli, in retribution
for plotting against their mother. Her parts were cast into the sky where they were
reconstituted as the moon. In Borderlands, Anzaldúa theorized the ‘Coatlicue state’ as a
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process of regeneration, unraveling and rebirthing the self. In her later works, especially in
the essay she wrote in response to the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks, she developed the
‘Coyolxauhqui imperative’ as a vision for reassembling the world in new shapes:
Coyolxauhqui is my symbol for the necessary process of dismemberment and
fragmentation, of seeing that self or the situations you’re embroiled in differently. It is
also my symbol for reconstruction and reframing, one that allows for putting the
pieces together in a new way. The Coyolxauhqui imperative is an ongoing process of
making and unmaking. There is never any resolution, just the process of healing.
(Anzaldúa, 2005:100)
In posing this ‘imperative’ as a response to global terrorism and global imperialism, Anzaldúa
rejects the United States’ self-defensive nationalism of the early 2000s and poses a vulnerable
subject in its place, one that rethinks configurations of power. This gesture is as decolonial as
it is precolonial, embracing forms of selfhood that are outside the Humanist frameworks of
European Empire. The Coatlicue state and the Coyolxauhqui imperative reject the assumed
necessity of the bounded, stable human subject and revolve around continued incoherence. I
return to Coyolxauhqui as a figure of corporeal disability below.
Just as the rise of Enlightenment Humanism coincided with the rise of global imperialism,
emerging critiques of Humanist thought coincide with decolonial critiques3. I have found
posthumanist theory helpful in understanding the ways in which Anzaldúa undermines the
foundations of social hierarchies. Posthumanism has been defined in a variety of ways, from
a projection of human values onto other-than-human entities to a rejection of ethics that value
human flourishing. Cary Wolfe (2010: 127) strikes a good balance, in my view: extending
ethics beyond Humanism by rejecting the assumption that ‘ethical standing and civic
inclusion are predicated on rationality, autonomy, and agency.’ Acknowledging that
Humanism is at the root of many forms of discrimination (especially against nonhuman
animals and bodies with disabilities), Wolfe looks for ‘an ethics based not on ability, activity,
agency, and empowerment but on a compassion that is rooted in our vulnerability and
passivity’ (141, original emphasis). This sort of ethics resonates beautifully with Anzaldúa’s
aim to use ‘wounds as openings to become vulnerable and available (present) to others’:
Although all your cultures reject the idea that you can know the other, you believe
that besides love, pain might open this closed passage by reaching through the wound
to connect. Wounds cause you to shift consciousness – they either open you to the
greater reality normally blocked by your habitual point of view or else shut you down.
(Anzaldúa 2002: 571-72)
This embrace of vulnerability, pain, and love offers a powerful way of rethinking our shared
belonging on the planet, ‘reaching’ and ‘connecting’ rather than competing and excluding.
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But, as Anzaldúa says, this idea is rejected by cultures (and individuals) that demonize
‘others’ and obsessively defend their own borders. How do we create a world that values
vulnerability and difference more than hegemony? A disability ethics demands that we do so.

Beyond classification
Anzaldúa became canonized as a Chicana lesbian, and since her death from complications
related to diabetes in 2004, has increasingly been claimed within the frameworks of disability
studies. Yet, throughout her life, she rejected identity labels. In her 1998 essay ‘To(o) Queer
the Writer,’ she wrote:
Identity is not a bunch of little cubbyholes…Identity is a river– a process. Contained
within the river is its identity, and it needs to flow, to change, to stay a river – if it
stopped it would be a contained body of water such as a lake or a pond. The changes
in the river are external (changes in environment– river bed, weather, animal life) and
internal (within the waters)…Changes in identity likewise are external (how others
perceive one and how one perceives others and the world) and internal (how one
perceives oneself, self-image) (2009:267)
This dialogue between self and context that Anzaldúa finds in identity is an ecological
phenomenon: rivers are a product of interaction among water, dirt, and animal endeavors
(such as building dams or creating climate change). Later, in a 2003 e-mail message to
AnaLouise Keating, though she agrees to having experienced disabling conditions, Anzaldúa
critiqued how the label ‘disabled’ draws medicalized parameters around fluid bodies
(Anzaldúa, 2003), freezing them into one category and rendering invisible any qualities that
exceed the priorities of institutionalized medicine. Instead, she identified with the continued
cycles of destruction and regeneration associated with Coatlicue and Coyolxauhqui. To stay a
river, a river must keep flowing.
Disability is an environmental term, not solely an intrinsic quality but, rather, a statement of
misalignment with social structures. It shifts determinism from bodies to the social structures
that incorrectly assume all people are capable of walking, hearing, reading printed words, or
reaching for light switches that are four feet off the ground. Tobin Siebers (2006:11) writes
that: ‘Disability seems to provide an example of the extreme instability of identity as a
political category, but it would not be easy, I think, to prove that disability is less significant
in everyday life for being a category in flux.’ It is important to emphasize that the fluidity and
decentered formation of disability coincide with its existence as an identity and as an
experience. Disability makes demands upon the societies that construct disabling
environments, and it does so without abiding by any coherent or singular framework. By
overflowing the bounds of corporeal norms, bodies marked as disabled challenge our systems
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of classification.
Before disability studies and posthumanism drew critical attention to the willed ignorance
involved in circumscribing a universal form of human life, Anzaldúa was already writing
about subjects with fluid sexual morphology (half male, half female)4, shape-shifting between
multiple species, and the ethical and material ties between humans, spirits, and nonhuman
nature. Anzaldúa’s approach to bodies evades the Humanist logic of representation and
identification. In describing her experience with hormone imbalance, she explains ‘the stuff
that was going on with me is like seeing a movie or reading a science fiction book, you
know?’ (Anzaldúa, 2000:35). Anzaldúa experienced her own disabling conditions in the
epistemological fold between medical diagnoses (which enforce the coloniality of power,
knowledge, and being) and trans-corporeal frameworks, like mysticism and science fiction
that defy empirical analysis. In the process, she imagines more capacious possibilities for
human life. While I find the tools of posthumanism helpful for analyzing these orientations,
the primary source for Anzaldúa’s alternative to humanism is her imaginative reclamation of
premodern sensibilities. She developed these ideas parallel to the emergence of posthumanist
thought (she was working on her PhD at UC Santa Cruz and was associates with famous
posthumanist theorists like Donna Haraway and Karen Barad), but she insistently claimed an
indigenous genealogy for her ideas about the permeability and pliability of being (‘I know
things older than Freud, older than gender,’ she pointed out in Borderlands (1987:48). I refer
to her vision, then, as other-than-Humanist rather than defining it relative to a historical
temporality of prehumanism, Humanism, and posthumanism. Anzaldúa’s ideas move outside
this genealogy.
Another important element of her other-than-Humanist perspective is its spirituality, its
embrace of ‘irrational’ experiences, like being occupied by spirits and soaring over her bed as
an eagle at night. I use quotation marks for the word irrational here because these experiences
are only irrational from the standpoint of secular Humanism; from the standpoint of Aztec
cosmologies, however, shape-shifting is part of a systematic worldview. ‘Irrational’ indicates
epistemological friction. By bringing the ontologies of Aztec thought into her writings about
her own embodiment, Anzaldúa creates friction between temporalities and epistemologies;
she undermines assumptions about human life and human history that are rarely questioned.
What does it mean to live like an Aztec goddess in the late twentieth-century United States?
We must use our imagination to answer this question because there is no historical or
empirical model to draw on.

Life, hormones, and other matters
The ‘irrational’ becomings of Anzaldúa’s unpublished autobiographical writings (found in the
Gloria E. Anzaldúa Papers) resist circumscription within even her own acclaimed decolonial
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theories. I have written elsewhere about the ways in which Anzaldúa’s experiences with
diabetes cut across identity politics: corporeal instability undermined any coherent sense of
self, and the technologies and medical institutions she relied upon created intimacies across
identity borders. But her earlier experiences of hormone imbalance– another chronic illness
with disabling symptoms– challenged conceptions of the human even more radically.
In the archive, I found an unpublished autobiography, ‘La serpiente que se come su cola,’
which discusses in great detail the various uterine and hormone disorders she briefly refers to
in her early publications. ‘La serpiente’ is an undated manuscript, but, since many of the life
experiences it describes overlap (often verbatim) with the contents of ‘La Prieta’ (Anzaldúa,
1983) and Borderlands (1987), I assume it was written in the 1980s. It consists of 276 pages,
with page numbers hand-written in the corners, and is a nearly complete text, with some
unresolved revisions (inserted edits and typeovers) and some sections still written in note
form (many of these consist of strips of paper cut and pasted onto the backs of fliers and other
‘used’ paper).
The subtitle of ‘La serpiente’ is ‘The Death and Rites of Passage of a Chicana Lesbian’.
Indeed, this is a life story in which the subject, herself, dies multiple times, so death is
embedded in life, neither singular nor permanent5. She speaks of past lives and recurring outof-body experiences (Anzaldúa, n.d.1: 65-68, 88-89, 110), suggesting that life transcends the
boundaries of individual human anatomy6. Further breaking with conventional
understandings of human development, Anzaldúa began menstruating at three months of age,
and her body developed breasts and grey hair prematurely. Menstruation brought her intense
pain: ‘raging fevers cooked my brain. Full flowing periods accompanied cramps, tonsillitis
and 105º fevers’ (Anzaldúa, 1983:200)7. In 1980, when she was living in San Francisco, her
internal pain worsened:
The pain woke her. The imperceptible flutter of a moth in her womb, followed by the
slow sure steady scissoring of bird wings, then the vulture beak. Pain: chalking first
her nostrils then her cheeks; haciendo sus manos nieve. Then the dull drone of bees
stirring restlessly in her nightmares. This the rhythm of her pain. And the cycle would
repeat itself a thousand times a day. (n.d.1:102)
In this description, she experiences her illness as a variety of different entities, all of them
nonhuman animals, all of them in motion. Her own interpretation of the illness is mobile–
first moth, then bird, then bees– and it turns her hands to snow (‘haciendo sus manos nieve’).
The unexpected verb ‘chalking’ could be a typo, an error in an uncorrected manuscript.
Perhaps she meant ‘choking’ or ‘chilling’ rather than chalking. In any case, these
transformations are unexpected, not usually caused by pain, and these material descriptions
resist coherent form and grate against expectations.
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According to the text, she goes to Valencia Clinic on March 12, and then St. Luke’s Hospital
on March 13, and receives an ‘official diagnosis’: a grapefruit-sized mass in her uterus
crowding out the other organs and an E. coli infection in her intestinal tract, which ‘leaked
into the uterus, the ovaries, the tubes, the vagina, the anus’ (n.d.1:128-29). In the next
sentence, Anzaldúa reclaims definitional power over her own body, claiming that the bacteria
were spawning not just tumors but ‘a monster growing in my uterus. My womb pregnant with
a demon, a virus that wouldn’t die. No antibiotic could kill it’ (29). She shifts the terms of
her illness from the rational to the irrational, from understandings offered by modern
medicine to the mystical: a monster or a demon that resists elimination by the doctors’ tools.
I see this representation not just in terms of cultural resistance but as a refusal to be
normalized according to the terms of Humanism.
A couple of pages later in the memoir, Anzaldúa includes a poem that she wrote (dated March
20, 1980) about the operation to remove her uterus:
She is asleep when the surgeon’s knife opens her.
The portal.
She awakens on the ceiling. She is
very small. She huddles
in a corner near the ceiling and watches
the red flowers blooming on the body
below. The body which is hers.
The white-robed priests hover over her. Vultures
feeding on her insides. (n.d.1:130-31)
Though she speaks of this body in the third person, and speaks from the perspective of an
entity that has left the body and floated up to the ceiling, she still claims the body as hers. She
identifies with/as a split self. She also describes her blood as flowers, a metaphor associated
with beauty and life, and describes the doctors as both priests and vultures. If vultures are
feeding on her, presumably she is dead, so her body couples life and death. This vision also
removes the hysterectomy from the terms of modern medicine and secular Humanism; she recodes the surgery as both sacred ritual and animal predation. This poem thus undoes the
progress narrative wherein medicine has ‘evolved’ beyond ‘primitive’ rites and ‘nature’ as
well as undoing linear conceptions of life and death.
A few pages later, Anzaldúa writes: ‘For her, the dismemberment meant a breaking up of the
old patterns, the death of the old self that had gotten fat and complacent... She had had to
create her own mysteries for man had long ago outlawed women’s mysteries’ (134).
Dismemberment equals both progress and regress here: breaking up ‘old,’ ‘fat,’ and
‘complacent’ patterns and creating mysteries that were lost ‘long ago’. Regeneration is
implicit in this backward looking. Trying to reclaim the ‘mystery’ of women’s health and
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embodiment, recalls Rosi Braidotti’s critique in ‘Mothers, Monsters, and Machines’ of the
modern worldview that deems embodied motherhood as a monstrosity requiring medical
normalization. Like Anzaldúa, Braidotti (1994:176) seeks to reclaim monsters’ preEnlightenment associations with ‘something wonderful, fantastic, rare, and precious’ 8.
Monsters, I would argue, are allies in disability ethics since they point out the insufficiency of
our normative identity categories and require that we honor the role of deviation in life.
Anzaldúa’s hormone imbalance was not a visible disability, but it altered the functioning of
her body at a basic level, leading to sometimes unpredictable discomforts. As with her
experiences of diabetes, Anzaldúa learned to expect corporeal fluidity as a part of her self,
and she had to turn to frameworks outside of secular Humanist medicine in order to find
value, rather than stigma, in her embodied multiplicity. Mel Chen (2012:7, 11) shares a
similar experience of illness leading to a reconsideration of the shape of life. Chen, too, starts
with a ‘veering-away from dominant ontologies and the normativities they promulgate,’ a
questioning of human foundationalism brought about by contemporary developments in
reproductive technologies, prosthetic devices, chemical toxicity, and other challenges to
traditional understandings of bodily coherence. Putting mothers, monsters, and machines into
dialogue denaturalizes human reproduction, normalizes monsters, and highlights the degrees
to which embodiment is permeated by other-than-human elements. With Braidotti, Chen, and
others, I welcome the openings that these other-than-Humanist developments provide for
disability theory and their new configurations of honor, love, and kinship that resonate with
critical race studies, feminist studies, and queer studies. I embrace, as well, the creation of
new material possibilities and ethical imaginings that come with broadening our conception
of human life.

Irrational figures and other-than-Humanist ethics
Later in her life, Anzaldúa embraced the Aztec moon goddess Coyolxauhqui as a model for
rethinking our place in the world. Here is the image we know as Coyolxauhqui, carved into a
stone that was uncovered at the Templo Mayor in Mexico City in 1978 (see Figure 1 below).
We never see Coyolxauhqui in the conventional shape of a woman. She is recognizable only
as this composite of corporeal fragments, some with and some without flesh, arranged in a
lunar circle. Life and death converge in this image that offers an alternative way of
conceiving human wholeness. Rather than standing on her two legs, Coyolxauhqui’s torso
floats above legs that are separated in a configuration that suggests motion, as if the
dismembered parts were running. Drawing from indigenous narratives like that of
Coyolxauhqui, thinking beyond and without the norms instituted by colonial Humanism,
enables Anzaldúa to accept fragmentation and fluidity as not just viable but sacred forms of
embodiment. Coyolxauhqui’s image is both terrifying and provocative: a punishment of the
disobedient daughter turned into an alternate kind of agency. (You can cut me up, but I will
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come back with an image strong enough to motivate generations of feminist, queer, and
Chicanx theory!)

Figure 1: Coyolxauhqui Stone

When I look at the Coyolxauhqui stone, I think about Levinas’s writings on the face and the
ways in which, when confronted with the face of an Other, we are wrought into an ethical
relationship. In Judith Butler’s interpretation, Levinas’s face is not a human one: it is a
resemblance of the precarity of life that cannot be captured by the representation of a human
form. Since normative schemas limit what a livable life is supposed to look like, Butler
(2004:144) argues that we need to highlight the ways in which precarious lives exceed the
conventional frames of representation:
For Levinas, then, the human is not represented by the face. Rather, the human is
indirectly affirmed in that very disjunction that makes representation impossible, and
this disjunction is conveyed in the impossible representation. For representation to
convey the human, the representation must not only fail, but it must show its failure.
There is something unrepresentable that we nevertheless seek to represent, and that
paradox must be retained in the representation we give. (original emphasis)
For Butler, ‘schemas of intelligibility’ perpetuated, for instance, by mainstream media decide
‘what will and will not be publicly recognizable as reality’ (147). Conventional frames of the
human exclude not only victims of U.S.-managed violence (Butler’s topic in Precarious Life)
but also, I would add, those who are disabled by conventional social structures and living
environments. In order to represent those who are unrepresentable in the shared conventions
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of the dominant culture, one must first point out the violence committed by those normative
conventions. This is precisely what the Coyolxauhqui stone achieves for Anzaldúa (and
others who invoke her image): its form is defined by violence and precarity. It forces us to
contemplate the violence that tears apart the disobedient daughter and, perhaps, to imagine
alternate possibilities for being and agency.
Yet Coyolxauhqui’s story is a closed circuit. Though her association with the moon means
that her body is changeable, her mythological story and her image are fixed in stone. The
fluidity of the moon follows a script that cannot be disrupted, waxing and waning in a
predictable fashion. I found other images in the Anzaldúa archive, though, that are more
uncertain and open in their structure, more critical of the limiting ‘status quo stories’
(AnaLouise Keating’s term) that limit how we think of the human. Anzaldúa was also a visual
artist, and most of the drawings I found depict fantastical creatures: part human, part animal,
part nonsense. She calls these drawings ‘doodles,’ a term I keep because it allows for lack of
rigor and imaginative freedom. She likely did not intend the doodles I analyze here to be
made public, but they provide evidence of the ways in which she used the visual to clarify
some of her more abstract ideas.
In an untitled sketch from 1977 (Figure 2), a figure is emerging from, but still embedded in,
an abstract background. The head and torso look human, but it is not clear how many arms
the figure has, and there is no distinguishable body below the torso. One of the arms holds
something that looks like a mask, on a string? It is not clear where the body ends and the
background begins in the lower half of the drawing. Is there a curly tail in the middle? It’s
also not clear what exactly undergirds the figure: chair? animal? toilet? But the curved
shapes and parallel lines of this shape are echoed in the figure, which suggests dialogue
between figure and background. I see this image as a form of environmental being; like
disability, it is shaped by its context. There is no determinate or autonomous form. This
image literally trans-shapes (another Anzaldúan term) every shape within it and allows for
many different stories to be told. It disrupts any one interpretation we might offer, at the same
time that it provokes and invites interpretation.
Another doodle (Figure 3) is ambiguous in both its title – either ‘Two Fishy Cats’ or ‘Fishy
Two Cats’ – and shape – conjoined animals that don’t look like either fish or cat (There are
two tails, but no fins or gills, no ears, and multiple antennae!). But this figure does make us
think about corporeal blending, species demarcation, and the possibilities of imagined
creatures. Is it fish or cat? One body or two? Does the jagged line in the middle represent
separation or suture? I would answer ‘neither’ or ‘both’ to all of these binary questions.
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Figure 2: Undated drawing

Figure 3: Undated drawing

A prospective title page I found in the archive (Figure 4), ‘Poems and Doodles by Gloria
Anzaldúa,’ suggests that she wanted to link the work of the visual and the work of language.
If the images illustrate any point from Anzaldúa’s written words, that point might be that our
imaginations are limited by status quo stories; the images supplement our imaginations with
shapes unknown, shapes that cannot be glossed over or translated into anything familiar. The
image on the title page inserts what seem to be faces into a non-representational maze, but it
also makes us wonder how we recognize a face as such. How do we know that these are
faces? They are all different shapes, so why do we put them into any single category? Is it
because they seem to have eyes? But what makes us think they are eyes? The dots in the
apparent faces don’t all come in twos. How do we know which is figure and which is
background, since the boundaries of each curve around the other? And were we even
thinking about species?
A final doodle from the archive (Figure 5) has a similar maze-like pattern with words
embedded within and around it. The shapes tempt us to compare them to familiar terms and
objects (like brains, titles, and calendars), but they are really beyond recognition. We might
assume that W. stands for ‘Wednesday’ because it appears above ‘7:30’. But it also appears
next to a 4 and a letter I don’t recognize and below ‘Home Girls’, which could be a reference
to the Barbara Smith’s (1983) edition published by Kitchen Table Press or something else.
The butterfly-like image at the bottom defies symmetry by having ‘Wed’ in one wing and
‘Thu’ in another, and the small head with cat-like ears has what looks like an ‘M’ inside it
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rather than anything resembling a cat face. Perhaps the clearest and most resonant point in
this drawing is ‘caramba’ (on the left) –surprise, exasperation, frustration, or wonder. (Wow:
what do we have here, and what assumptions are we bringing to it?)

Figure 4: Undated drawing

Figure 5: Undated drawing
These images ask us to jettison the filters through which we have been taught to perceive and
conceive the world. In particular, they ask us to let go of the expectation that a figure (human,
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animal, or plant) should be at the center of our epistemologies or our ontologies; we can think
and be without ‘man.’ In her call for a truly post-human posthumanism, Claire Colebrook
(2014) suggests that feminists need to question not just the male subject at the heart of
Humanism but also the ways in which life under Humanism was configured around human
thriving. (One should extrapolate from this point that critiquing the universalization of any
dominant identity under Humanism – like whiteness or able-bodiedness – would not be
sufficient either). As Colebrook (2014:9-10) speculates: ‘the very question that enabled
women to challenge the rights of men, will lead to a full-scale destruction of any assumed
right whatsoever…Feminism’s critique of man will not only transform humanity and its
milieu but will open up a new thought of life’. Colebrook notes the turn to life in general in
eco-feminism and concludes that ‘what needs to be thought today is that which cannot be
thought, lived, retrieved, or revitalized as the saving grace of man or woman’ (17). I would
argue that these archival doodles enact just this sort of ‘thought experiment’ that Colebrook
calls for ten years after the Anzaldúa’s death. Although one might be inclined to read these
images as derivations of the human figure, they not only resist being pinned down by one life
form but lead us to question our rationale for finding a ‘figure’ in the drawing. I could find
nine or ten eyes in doodle #4 and two heads in doodle #3, but why? What might I see if I was
looking without anthropocentrism?
Imagination is an important tool for Anzaldúa in her attempts to prod the limits of human life.
In the memoir, she uses imagination to challenge the narrative form of human life; in the
doodles, she challenges its visual coherence or recognizability. Imagination does not have to
abide by established realities, reason, or empiricism. In her un-defended doctoral dissertation,
published by AnaLouise Keating as Light in the Dark: Luz en los oscuro in 2015, Anzaldúa
(2015:36-37) discusses imagination as a creative force that generates life forms: ‘The
imaginal’s figures and landscapes are experienced as alive and separate from the dreamer.’
But these works of the imagination are not therefore ‘fantasy, not reality’; rather, ‘we must
redefine the imagination not as a marginal nonreality nor as an altered state, but as another
type of reality’. The works of imagination help to create the reality we live in; they give form
to our feelings and mold our perceptions.
Yet creating alternate life forms requires us to suspend not only our disbelief (in the ‘reality’
of imagination), but also our belief in the reality we perceive ourselves as inhabiting:
To change or reinvent reality, you engage the facultad of your imagination. You must
interrupt or suspend the conscious ‘I’ that reminds you of your history and beliefs
because these reminders tie you to certain notions of reality and behavior…We must
empower the imagination to blur and transcend customary frameworks and conceptual
categories reinforced by language and consensual reality (44-45)
If reality is ‘consensual,’ it is continually being enacted and configured by all of its
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participants (human and nonhuman). Choosing to alter one’s relationship to reality would
challenge those with whom one shares the world to shift in response. (If we believe, for
instance, that there is a spike in violent crime in our city, we will react in fear, avoiding others
and thereby creating disconnections and hostilities. If we believe that our world is a safe
place, we will approach all that we touch with greater sensitivity and openness). If we open
our imaginations to other modes of relating, our relationships will change– as will the entities
with which we relate.
As Keating (2012: 53) writes in her essay on Anzaldúa’s ‘poet-shaman aesthetics’:
While it might seem to be common sense to dismiss this discussion as ‘simply’
metaphoric and thus limited exclusively to the power of disembodied, intangible
words, to do so overlooks the possibility that language’s causal power can provoke
additional material levels of transformation. According to Anzaldúa, these linguistic
images, when internalized, can trigger the imagination, which then affects our
embodied state—our physical bodies—at the cellular level.
Keating derives her argument from indigenous theories of the causality of language (theories
with which Anzaldúa was familiar), and she describes writing and reading as enacting a form
of alchemy, citing her own experiences of transformation in response to reading Anzaldúa’s
work (59). Anzaldúa describes this process in her essay ‘Tlilli, Tlapalli’: ‘The ability of story
(prose and poetry) to transform the storyteller and the listener into something or someone else
is shamanistic’ (1987:66). These experiences are difficult to measure, too personal to be
objective, and they challenge the bounds of rational academic discourse. And this is precisely
what Anzaldúa wants to do: to make us question the limits we impose upon knowledge and
upon life (our own and that of our entire ecosystem).
In the spirit of expanding what we deem thinkable, Braidotti (1994:173) critiqued the
dismissal of monstrosity. Disability studies have likewise been dedicated to eradicating the
view that deviations from the norm are ‘eminently disposable’. Anzaldúa’s imaginative
figures help to expand the shape of what we regard as a viable life. She does this by reaching
outside of secular individualism and by forcing readers and viewers to confront the violent
exclusions committed by imperial Humanism. As Chen (2012:237) concludes:
I wish for an ethics of care and sensitivity that extends far from humans’ (or the
Human’s) own borders. It is in queer of color and disability/crip circles…that I have
often found blossoming this ethics of care and sensitivity, queerings of objects and
affects accompanied by political revision, reworldings that challenge the order of
things.
By looking before, after, and beyond Humanism, Anzaldúa’s work resonates with the subjects
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of disability studies not just in a biographical sense, but also in a theoretical sense. Her otherthan-Humanist sources provide vivid examples and alternate epistemologies to enact the
reworlding Chen calls for.

Conclusion
In an emblematic passage from ‘La serpiente,’ Anzaldúa addresses her relationship with
nonhuman life:
She was not as she appeared to be to others. She was the wolf in the woods, the
vulture circling overhead. She was the hemlock pine, the wood wind and the night.
Beneath the human mask was the animal face and under the animal was the ‘thing,’
the non-human face. And she was terrified of that third face…The only way not to
fear the non-human world was to embrace the non-human in herself. If she let her
being flow into the white pine and the spider and the night wind and if she allowed
their spirits to come into her, then nothing supernatural could harm her for she too
would be supernatural. (n.d.1:182)
This blending between self and wild(er)ness is presented as a form of safety: embracing the
other as a part of oneself erases the distinctions between self and other and renders fear
meaningless. There is no predatory, supernatural power over the human because the human
has blended with the supernatural. Yet this safety is bought at the price of a loss of individual
coherence and recognizability. The ethical conclusions of this sentiment are wonderful, but
this blending is generally demonized in modern cultures, regarded as madness, ‘the shock of
two worlds merging’ (Anzaldúa, n.d.1:183). Embracing such madness places Anzaldúa’s
worldview outside of contemporary critical or political discourse– yet also within
contemporary disability discourse. I think here of Rosemarie Garland Thomson’s (1996:3)
embrace of the term ‘freak’ as still redolent of its pre-modern legacy of ‘revelation’ and
‘awe’. Using the terms ‘freak’ or ‘mad’ in the age of neo-liberal medicine, points out radical
otherness that our current institutions cannot handle.
The risk of these wild/undomesticated imaginings is that readers might not take them as
seriously as Anzaldúa’s better known theories (like the borderlands and mestiza
consciousness), which were often embraced to the degree that they resonated with the
academic discourse of liminality and hybridity. Amputated agency, inter-species shapeshifting, and supernatural bodies challenge our thinking about human subjectivity at a deeper,
more fundamental level than racial hybridity, linguistic mixture, or blurring national borders.
Their ethical potential, I would say, is thereby greater. Rethinking the shape of human life
takes us outside of the hierarchies instituted by colonialism and contemporary sociopolitical
mappings. Anzaldúa’s intellectual bravery enables her to think big and to believe that our
1577

Disability and the Global South

world could be otherwise. Surely many scholars will think that these ideals are too remote to
spend time on, but I think that today’s status quo stories run too deep to be uprooted by
anything but radical digging. The meaning of the human, itself, underlies not just hierarchies
among sociopolitical identities, but also the violent exclusion of bodies that deviate from the
norm. We need writers and artists to depict alternate beings and agencies that move us
beyond the single-minded focus on the autonomous individual. Gracias, Gloria.

Notes
1

See Bost (2015) for an analysis of the form and function of this archive.
See Bost (2009) and Keating (2012) for a discussion of Anzaldúa’s creative deployment of
pre-colonial indigenous traditions.
3
In an essay on spirituality and decolonizing the heart, Laura E. Pérez (2014) also draws a
comparison between the boundaries instituted by colonialism and those instituted by the
Enlightenment. In this light, decolonization must take on Humanism too. Pérez (2014: 23-24,
25) describes ‘the historically specific aftereffect of colonization of the Americas and the
rationalization of racialized, gendered, and sexed hierarchical orders in post-Enlightenment
thought– that we are unrelated, gulfs apart from nature, from other people, even from parts of
our own selves, as if our interdependence on all these levels were fantasy, delusion,
superstition, or the demonic’ as a ‘crumbling faith act,’ a fragmentation associated with our
‘interpellation’ ‘within modern western(ized) culture that consents in various degrees to the
interests of dominating economic, political, and social classes’. Embracing interdependence –
with other humans as well as with other-than-human nature – would help to topple this false
ideology.
4
See especially the chapter ‘Movimientos de rebeldía y las culturas que traicionan’ in
Anzaldúa (1987) for a discussion of sex/gender mixture and fluidity.
5
The exact number of deaths varies depending upon how one defines life and how one
interprets the text, but there are at least four. (Chapter Five, narrating her experience of
having tumors growing in her womb and her subsequent hysterectomy, is called ‘Death
Four’). The first death is presumably the issuance of her birth certificate, which misspelled
the names of both parents and the baby and erroneously indicated that she had been born dead
(Anzaldúa, n.d.1:9). She claims the onset of menstruation at three months as a second death
(271).
6
In a 1975 journal entry incorporated into the manuscript of La serpiente, Anzaldúa
(n.d.1:68) writes of tripping on magic mushrooms in order to tap into this larger ‘spirit-body
thing’: objects in the room begin to glow and to smell, taking on a kind of vitality of their
own. She begins to hear sounds from far away and to see the unconscious thoughts and fears
of others (88-89). While examining her own image in the mirror, she sees her face as layers
of masks. From this experience, she develops her idea of ‘La Gloria Multíplice’ (also
2
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discussed in Anzaldúa, 1987: 44), a ‘Cubist-like’ self with multiple angles and many
orientations at once (n.d.1: 88-90).
7
Anzaldúa writes of this experience in Borderlands: ‘I felt alien, I knew I was alien. I was
the mutant stoned out of the herd, something deformed with evil inside’ (1987:43).
8
This is similar to Rosemarie Garland Thomson’s embrace of the term ‘freak’ and its
valuation prior to the advent of Humanist thought.
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